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Currently, there are two main views on insightful problem solving.  Results of the studies 
supporting “business-as-usual” theory suggest that the processes involved in solving insight 
problems are the same as in analytical problem solving—slow, controlled, and effortful, while 
findings of the studies supporting the restructuring theory of insight suggest involvement of fast 
and automatic, one-trial-learning type of processes.  The goal of the current study was to 
investigate the construct validity of the Aha! ratings, used in many studies as the measure of 
insight, by isolating its three components, effort, confidence, and suddenness, and examining 
their correlation with working memory span.  Ninety-eight undergraduate students from a 
Southeastern university completed reading and operational span tasks, as well as the compound 
remote associates task.  Self-reported ratings of Effort, Confidence, and Suddenness were 
collected individually for each compound remote associates set.  Correlations between the three 
ratings were low to moderate; Cohen’s kappa used to measure pair-wise agreement between the 
ratings was below .80 for each pair; Cronbach’s alpha demonstrated low internal consistency.  Of 
the three components, only Suddenness correlated with working memory capacity.  Suddenness 
also correlated with the difficulty of the problem.
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Insight, a sudden awareness of an underlying structure or pattern, or an unexpected 
comprehension of an answer to a question, not obvious before, is a cognitive process involved in 
learning and problem solving, usually defined by phenomenological sensations of surprise, 
pleasure, confidence, and ease (Topolinski & Reber, 2010).  This process may be as simple and 
quick as “getting” a pun or as complex and resulting from a series of preceding efforts as 
Mendeleev’s dream of the periodic table of elements (Kedrov, 1967).   
The Gestalt View of Insightful Learning 
The first investigations into the psychological phenomenon of insight were conducted by 
the Gestalt psychologists in the early 20th century (Sternberg & Davidson, 1995). The Gestalt 
psychologists argued that processes involved in re-productive thinking—an ability to use 
previously acquired knowledge and learned algorithms for solving familiar problems—were 
different from those eliciting productive thinking (Wertheimer, 1945).  Instances of productive 
thinking are demonstrated when a new solution is born out of the internal, behavioral 
environment, with no external stimuli, often after an impasse—a sense of being “stuck”, unable 
to perform any further steps while searching for a solution in the initial representation of the 
problem.  One possible cause of impasse, functional fixedness— a mental predisposition to a 
familiar function of an object and an inability to apply it in a new way—was introduced by 
Duncker (1945).  To demonstrate this notion, he developed an experiment in which participants, 
given a box of matches, several tacks, and a candle, were asked to fix a candle to the wall so that 
the wax wouldn’t drip on the floor.  The subjects demonstrated functional fixedness by their 
inability to consider the box containing matches as a candleholder.   
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To investigate the cognitive ability to produce novel solutions, Gestalt psychologists 
introduced a notion of restructuring, a mental process of abandoning faulty (incomplete or 
intentionally misleading) representation of a problem, which causes an impasse, and arriving at a 
new representation leading to a sudden solution (e.g.  Duncker, 1945).  During this process, prior 
knowledge and experience, never sharing a connection before, are being internally rearranged.  
This produces a novel problem representation, leading to a spontaneous solution.  In contrast to 
the gradual, trial-and-error process of associative learning, this qualitatively different type of 
problem solving is a one-trial, insightful learning (Ash, Jee, & Wiley, 2012).  For example, in 
Köhler’s experiments (1925), his chimpanzees suddenly, and with no changes in the 
environment, arrived at the novel for them approach of reaching for food with an implement 
(joined bamboo sticks or stacked crates) after losing interest in unreachable bananas and 
abandoning unsuccessful attempts. 
Modern Theories of Insight 
Since the first explorations into the phenomenon of sudden learning, several theories 
attempting to explain its nature and mechanisms were proposed.  Currently, a debate exists 
between two schools of thought. One holds the view of insight being a “business-as-usual” or 
“nothing special” process (Ball & Stevens, 2009; Chein & Weisberg, 2014; MacGregor, 
Ormerod, & Chronicle, 2001; Weisberg & Alba, 1982), not different from analytical thinking. 
The other views restructuring as a process of automatic redistribution of memory activation (Ash 
& Wiley, 2006; Durso, Rea, & Dayton, 1994; Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider, & Rhenius, 1999; 
Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987; Ohlsson, 1992).  The alternative, dual-process, theory presumes 
involvement of both, Type 1 (fast and independent of working memory) and Type 2 (slow and 
heavily dependent on working memory) processes that are involved in insight (Evans, 2011; 
3 
Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Lin, Hsu, Chen, & Wang, 2012).  Before we explore these 
theories in more detail, it is worth mentioning that the Gestalt psychologists used the term insight 
sparingly, as a deep understanding of the problem internal structure.  Thus, restructuring, from 
their point of view, is an underlying process, different from incremental learning, and capable of 
explaining one-trial-learning phenomenon.  In many modern studies on insight, however, it is 
seen more as a synonym of the subjective Aha! experience that may or may not accompany 
sudden learning.  This will be elaborated on in the Aha! Ratings as the Source of the Conflicting 
Results section.   
Restructuring as an Automatic Process 
Problem solving is not possible without memory since it involves allocating attentional 
resources and holding current goals in working memory (WM), while also activating relevant 
experiences in long-term memory (Baddeley, 2000). The main debate on mechanisms of insight 
revolves around involvement of different aspects of memory at different stages of problem-
solving process.  Building on the Gestalt theory of restructuring and seeing it as a process 
different from the analytical problem solving, some modern psychologists utilized current 
models of semantic networks and spreading activation in long-term memory to suggest that the 
mechanism of restructuring is an automatic process.  For instance, Knoblich et al. (1999) found 
evidence for automatic processes related to the experience of impasse and mechanisms involved 
in overcoming it.  Also, Metcalfe and Wiebe (1987) found that subjective ratings of perceived 
closeness to the solution on memory-retrieval trivia tasks were highly correlated with 
performance, while those on insight problems were not at all predictive of performance on the 
task, suggesting a sudden and automatic nature of insight.  Moreover, a neuroimaging study by 
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Jung-Beeman et al. (2004) demonstrated that overcoming an impasse could involve switching 
between fine and coarse semantic coding regions of the brain.   
Since solving an incomplete, unfamiliar or intentionally misleading problem involves 
searching through a faulty initial problem space, potentially leading to an impasse, it is a 
demanding process in terms of WM capacity.  According to the model proposed by Baddeley 
and Hitch (1974), working memory is considered a more functional and dynamic component of 
memory than simply a temporary data storage.  Working memory is a system which allows 
short-term manipulation of data by complex cognitive processes and comprises separate 
components for processing auditory stimuli and visuospatial information, as well as the central 
executive component—to combine and organize auditory and visual stimuli, distribute 
attentional resources between them, while using relative information from the long-term memory 
storage (Baddeley, 2003).  To measure WM capacity, various WM span tasks were developed, 
where a demanding cognitive process, e.g., verification, comprehension, enumeration, is paired 
with a task of word recall (Conway, et al., 2005).  Research findings suggest that individual 
differences in WM capacity are associated with individual differences in the attentional resources 
allocated by the central executive function of WM (Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001). 
To investigate the influence of individual differences in WM span on the performance on 
insight problems, Ash and Wiley (2006) conducted a study aimed at isolating the restructuring 
phase.  One group of participants solved the classical version of spatial insight problems with 
many moves available in the initial faulty search space, while the other group solved different 
version of the same problems modified in such a way that the search space had only few possible 
moves.  The latter version of the task allowed the search space to be quickly exhausted thus 
eliminating the search phase from the problem-solving process and preserving only the impasse 
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resolving phase through restructuring.  The researchers then examined how WM span correlated 
with the performance during isolated restructuring versus all the phases of the problem-solving 
process.  They found that individual differences in ability to control attention predicted the 
performance on the insight problems that include both the initial search phase and the 
restructuring phase.  However, WM span scores did not correlate with the performance on 
insight problems with the isolated restructuring phase, therefore suggesting an automatic nature 
of the process of restructuring.   
“Business-as-Usual” View of Insight 
The Gestalt theory contemplated covert mental processes whose mechanisms it did not 
have the framework to explain yet. As such, it was often misinterpreted as “something special” 
view, imbuing the process of restructuring with some “mysterious” notion of spontaneous insight 
(Dominowski, 1981; Weisberg & Alba, 1981a).  Moreover, the second half of the 20th century 
was the time when the information-processing model of cognition was developed.  This model 
compares mental processes to the processes operating in a computer and as such is rooted in 
memory, previous experience, and learning-based adaptation to the environment (Simon, 1978).  
Based on this model, some researchers viewed the notion of functional fixedness introduced by 
the Gestalt psychologists as a dismissal of the importance of previous experience in problem 
solving  (Weisberg & Alba, 1981b).   
These arguments gave rise to an opposing theory suggesting that insight does not differ 
from the “business-as-usual” mechanisms underlying analytical problem solving, and therefore is 
a “nothing special” process that largely depends on problem-specific knowledge (Weisberg & 
Alba, 1982; Weisberg, Dicamillo, & Phillips, 1978) and is controlled and effortful (Kaplan & 
Simon, 1990).  Some of the proponents of this view employed the Compound Remote Associates 
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task (CRA; Mednick, 1962) to find empirical support for it.  In this task, subjects are asked to 
come up with a forth word that would create a new compound with the three words provided in 
each problem set. For example, for three given words, man glue star, the solution super produces 
a new compound with each, superman, super glue, super star. To support the “business-as-
usual” view, Ball and Stevens (2009) argued that since articulatory suppression on CRA task 
hindered the performance, it provided evidence of insight being a non-automatic process.  Also, 
in attempt to disprove the role of functional fixedness and restructuring in insight problems, 
Weisberg and Alba (1981a) demonstrated that participants did not attain a sudden solution after 
being given a hint to widen their search space on the nine-dot problem (Figure 1), thus removing 
fixation on the square, and that only providing a detailed description of the solution facilitated 
their performance. 
 
Figure 1.  The nine-dot problem.  The nine dots form a square.  The solution consists of four 
straight lines that are interconnected and pass through all the dots.  The lines should be 
drawn without lifting a pen from the paper.   
 
 
Building on the fact that analytical problem solving depends on strategic processes 
(Gilhooly & Murphy, 2005) and, thus, requires WM resources, Chein, Weisberg, Streeter, and 
Kwok (2010) demonstrated that WM span predicted faster solving times on the nine-dot insight 
problem.  Building on those findings, Chein and Weisberg (2014) presented participants with 
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WM span tasks and CRA problems, followed by participants’ subjective insight ratings.  Upon 
solving each CRA set, participants were asked to assess their method of arriving at a solution on 
a 4-point scale, running from highly strategic to highly insightful.  These ratings were found to 
be correlated with the verbal WM capacity, suggesting that insight is an effortful and controlled 
process.   
Dual-Process Theory 
To contextualize the diverse proposals of implicit and explicit mechanisms involved in 
higher cognitive processes, including decision-making and problem solving, a dual-process 
theory was proposed (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Stanovich, 1999).  It suggests that cognition 
engages two different systems involved in thinking, reasoning, social judgment, etc., with 
System 1 being fast, automatic or unconscious, and therefore independent of working memory, 
and System 2 being slow, effortful, conscious and thus heavily dependent on working memory.  
Arguing that while these “systems”, as of yet, are still conceptual and not necessarily 
physiologically separate and/or shared with other species, Evans (2008; 2011) proposed to refer 
to the slow, capacity-limited, deliberate cognitive mechanisms as Type 2, while the automated, 
WM-independent, fast ones as Type 1.   
Aha! Ratings as the Source of the Conflicting Results 
The results of studies supporting “nothing special” or Type 2 view of insight and those 
supporting the notion of automated or Type 1 process of restructuring are in conflict.  While the 
empirical evidence in favor of the former argues that the insight ratings highly correlate with 
WM capacity, the latter demonstrates that WM span correlates only with the performance on the 
pre-impasse stage of the insight tasks, but not with the restructuring phase.   
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To remedy this conflict, the current study proposes to re-examine current methodology 
utilized in defining and measuring the construct of insight.  As with consciousness or awareness, 
insight is a ubiquitously familiar, yet difficult to define phenomenon.  A recent review (Dietrich 
& Kanso, 2010) of 20 neuroimaging studies targeting neural correlates of the insight experience 
concluded that the results differ substantially from study to study, not only in terms of specific 
brain structures, but also in attributing Aha! experiences to a specific hemisphere.  While 
acknowledging complexity of the insight problem-solving process and a possibility that it cannot 
be attributed to a handful of simple processes or specific neural correlates, the authors also point 
out that the lack of common methodology in defining insight in the reviewed studies may be a 
possible reason for empirical discrepancies.  In many studies, insight is not clearly defined for 
participants, they are simply asked to rate how insightful their solution felt (Dietrich & Kanso, 
2010).  Moreover, multiple studies use the concept of insight interchangeably with 
phenomenological Aha! experiences (Chein & Weisberg, 2014; Jung-Beeman, et al., 2004; 
Posner, 1973; Worthy, 1975).  For instance, in a study by Bowden and Jung-Beeman (2003), 
participants were instructed that the use of a strategy would qualify as a low-insight rating on a 
1-5 rating scale, while the absence of awareness, “I just knew, I don’t know how I knew”, should 
be counted as a high-insight rating.  A rating of 5 was explained to participants as the following: 
“When you saw the word you suddenly knew that it was the answer (‘It popped into my head’; 
‘Of course!’ ‘That’s so obvious’; ‘It felt like I was already thinking that’).”  Other studies define 
insight as a complex experience, comprising such components as suddenness, obviousness, and 
confidence.  For example, in Jung-Beeman et al.’s 2004 study insight was defined as follows:  
A feeling of insight is a kind of ‘Aha!’ characterized by suddenness and obviousness.  
You may not be sure how you came up with the answer, but are relatively confident that 
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it is correct without having to mentally check it.  It is as though the answer came into 
mind all at once—when you first thought of the word, you simply knew it was the 
answer.  This feeling does not have to be overwhelming, but should resemble what was 
just described.  
To illustrate further, in another study (Danek, Fraps, Müller, Grothe, & Öllinger, 2013) exploring 
insight through magic tricks, insight is defined very similar, as follows: 
We would like to know whether you experienced a feeling of insight when you solved a 
magic trick.  A feeling of insight is a kind of ‘Aha!’ characterized by suddenness and 
obviousness.  Like an enlightenment.  You are relatively confident that your solution is 
correct without having to check it.  In contrast, you experienced no Aha! if the solution 
occurs to you slowly and stepwise, and if you need to check it by watching the clip once 
more.  As an example, imagine a light bulb that is switched on all at once in contrast to 
slowly dimming it up.  We ask for your subjective rating whether it felt like an Aha! 
experience or not, there is no right or wrong answer.  Just follow your intuition. 
Thus, even when the multifaceted nature of insight is addressed, still, participants are instructed 
to assign only one number to it when rating the experience.  Recently, some experiments were 
conducted which analyzed correlations between the components of Aha! ratings (Danek & 
Wiley, 2017; Webb, Little, & Cropper, 2016), however, no study has been conducted to assess 
the validity of Aha! ratings as a construct of insight.   
An Aha! experience is assumed to include such components as surprise, pleasure, 
confidence, and ease (Topolinski & Reber, 2010), therefore, this construct could be a 
multidimensional entity encompassing strategy versus insight, suddenness, effort, and confidence 
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components.  Furthermore, it may be influenced by multiple confounding factors, such as false 
insights (Danek & Wiley, 2017) or a hindsight bias (Ash & Wiley, 2008). 
The Current Study 
 To investigate the multiple components of the Aha! ratings used as the measure of the 
insight construct, we replicated Chein and Weisberg (2014) which utilized self-report insight 
ratings similar to Jung-Beeman et al.’s study described earlier. In contrast to the one-item 
measure they used, a measure which mixed feelings of suddenness, confidence, and effort in one 
rating, we broke down the Aha! ratings into three separate components, Suddenness, Confidence, 
and Effort.  In the current study we administered verbal and operational WM span tasks, as well 
as the same version of the CRA task.  To examine the validity of the Aha! ratings, Confidence, 
Effort, and Suddenness of each solution attempt on each of the CRA sets were measured 
separately through self-reported ratings.  Following the data collection stage, the results were 
analyzed in terms of correlation between WM span and each component of the insight.  The 
predictions were as follows.  If insight is a three-factor structure that can be measured through 
confidence, suddenness, and effort ratings (specifically as high confidence, high suddenness and 
low effort), the three components should highly correlate with each other, have high internal 
consistency, and high level of pair-wise agreement as measured by Cohen’s kappa, thus 
demonstrating construct validity.  If each component also correlates with WM span, these would 
support the results of “business-as-usual” theory.  If, however, components are not 
intercorrelated, as confidence and effort are not always indicative of insight (Danek & Wiley, 
2017), this would suggest that the findings of studies supporting “business-as-usual” theory 
measure some other construct rather than insight.  
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Therefore, the aim of the current study is to explore validity of the Aha! construct 
associated with insight by means of recording the individual measures of suddenness, effort, and 
confidence independently, examining correlations of each of the components with the WM span, 
and extracting the component which drives the results of Type 2 or “nothing special” empirical 





To replicate correlation between verbal working memory (WM) capacity and 
performance on compound remote associates (CRA) task found by Chein and Weisberg (2014; r 
= 0.39, p < .01), we performed power analysis (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003) to define 
the sample size for the desirable power of 1 – β  = .80 and α set at .05.  The sample size yielded 
by the analysis was N = 84.  To account for possible data loss due to incompletion of tasks 
and/or lack of accuracy on tasks, 143 undergraduate students from Old Dominion University 
were recruited for course credit.   
The demographics was as follows: 68.4% women; age ranged between 18 and 40 (M = 
19.85, SD = 3.62); 76.5% had college algebra within the last five years; 93.9% were native 
English speakers (see Tables 1 and 2 for detailed demographics).  
Participants signed the informed consent form before participation and were debriefed 






 n (M)     % (SD) 
Age 19.85 3.62 
   
Sex     
   Female 67 68.4 
   Male 31 31.6 
Total 98 100.0 
   
Algebra     
   I've had a college level algebra class in the past 5 years. 75 76.5 
   I've had a college level algebra class in the past 10 years. 4 4.1 
   I've had a college level algebra class more than 10 years ago. 1 1.0 
   I've NEVER had a college level algebra class. 18 18.4 
Total 98 100.0 
   
English   
   English has ALWAYS been my primary language. 92 93.9 
   English has been my primary language for MORE than 10 years. 2 2.0 
   English has been my primary language for LESS than 5 years. 1 1.0 
   English is NOT my primary language. 3 3.0 
Total 98 100.0 





Participant Academic Major Count and Percentage 
 n % 
Biochemistry 3 3.1 
Biology 8 8.2 
Chemistry 3 3.1 
Civil Engineering 1 1.0 
Communication 2 2.0 
Computer Engineering 3 3.1 
Computer Science 4 4.1 
Criminal Justice 7 7.1 
Dental Hygiene 1 1.0 
English Education 1 1.0 
Exercise Science 5 5.1 
Health Services Administration 1 1.0 
Human Services 2 2.0 
Industrial Engineering 1 1.0 
Marine Biology 1 1.0 
Mechanical Engineering 4 4.1 
Medical Laboratory Science 1 1.0 
Nursing 13 13.3 
Occupational and Technical Studies 2 2.0 
Psychology 24 24.5 
Recreation Therapy 2 2.0 
Sociology 1 1.0 
Speech-Language Pathology and Audiology 1 1.0 
Sports Management 1 1.0 
Therapeutic Recreation 2 2.0 
Undecided 4 4.1 




Some of the data were excluded due to task incompletion; data of the participants whose 
accuracy on math or reading during OSPAN and RSPAN respectively dropped below 85% 
(Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005; see Table 3 for the exclusion statistics) were also 
excluded. The drop rate on OSPAN (14.8%) and RSPAN (18.9%) were in line with the previous 
findings for the automated span tasks (Unsworth et al., 2005).  The analyses were conducted on 




Exclusion Criteria and Percentage of Data Excluded from the Analysis 
 
Reason n % 
Unfinished WM Tasks 3 2.1 
Compromised WM Scores 4 2.8 
Low OSPAN Accuracy 21 14.8 
Low RSPAN Accuracy 27 18.9 
Total Excluded 45 31.5 




Compound Remote Associates Task.  CRA task, a.k.a. Remote Associates Task (RAT; 
Mednick, 1962), is used to assess individual differences in associative processing, problems 
solving, creativity, and insight.  As this was the main task utilized in Chein and Weisberg (2014), 
it was used in this study as well—to test the validity of Chein and Weisberg’s construct of 
insight.  Following a screen with three fixation points, participants were presented with a set of 
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three words and a text box for typing their solution.  They were asked to produce a fourth word 
that yields a new compound word (or phrase) with each of the three words in a set, in a 45-
second time interval.  For instance, the fourth word for the set pine crab sauce is the word apple, 
which produces new compounds pineapple, crabapple, and apple sauce (Appendix A).  The 
reaction time and the entered word were recorded upon the “Enter” key strike.  Once the solution 
was entered (either the correct or an incorrect one), subject were prompted to rate their solving 
process on three components, as follows: (a) on the Suddenness scale, from (1) Not Sudden to (4) 
Very Sudden—how unexpectedly the solution came; (b) on the Confidence scale, from (1) Not 
Confident to (4) Very Confident—how confident they are in the solution’s correctness; and (c) on 
the scale of Effort, from (1) Not Effortful to (4) Very Effortful—how hard they felt they had to 
work to come up with the fourth word (Appendix B).  An average score on each component 
comprised a participant’s score for each dimension.  In case of the correct response, participants 
were presented with the next set of words.  Otherwise, they were given another trial with the 
incorrectly solved set, until the expiration of the 45-second interval.  The task consists of 60 sets, 
which were presented in a random order.   
Working Memory Span Tasks.  Working memory capacity tasks are used to predict 
performance on higher and lower order cognitive tasks through dual-tasking (Conway et al., 
2005).  In problem solving and insight research these tasks are utilized to predict performance on 
analytical problem solving.  WM span tasks present subjects with letters (or words) to memorize 
for later recall and also require processing of a secondary task, with semantic validation of 
sentences and simple arithmetic problems being most commonly used variations. Two WM 
capacity tasks, operation span task (OSPAN; Turner & Engle, 1989) and reading span task 
(RSPAN; Daneman & Carpenter, 1980), were utilized in the current study to account for 
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individual differences on reading and arithmetic skills.  The OSPAN and RSPAN scores were 
averaged to isolate the shared variance which represents the WM capacity score. 
OSPAN task.  Subjects were presented with the letter sequences ranging from three to 
seven letters that they needed to recall at the end of each sequence.  Each letter in a sequence is 
preceded by a simple arithmetic problem, e.g., “(8 + 2) ÷ 2”, followed by a proposed solution, 
e.g., “5”, to be evaluated as correct or incorrect (Appendix C).  At the end of each sequence, 
participants are asked to select letters they can recall in a letter matrix presented on the screen. 
RSPAN task.  Participants were presented with the letter sequences ranging from three to 
seven letters that they needed to recall at the end of each sequence.  Each letter in a sequence is 
preceded by a sentence problem, e.g., “Every now and then I catch myself swimming blankly at 
the wall”, to be evaluated for semantic correctness (Appendix D).  At the end of each sequence, 
subjects are asked to select the recalled letters in a letter matrix presented on the screen. 
Reliability and Validity of Tasks.  CRA task was demonstrated to be a valid measure of 
creativity, as scores on the task correlate with scores on research creativity check list (r = .55, p < 
.005), as well as with Miller Analogy Test scores (r = .41, p < .025; Mednick, 1963).  Spearman-
Brown reliability coefficient for the task was found to be r = .92 and r = .91 for two independent 
samples (Mednick, 1963).  In later reliability analysis, the task demonstrated high internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s α = .82; Lee, Huggins, & Therriault, 2014). Scores on OSPAN and 
RSPAN tasks were demonstrated to correlate with scores on various higher and lower order 
cognitive tasks, including reading and listening comprehension, writing, reasoning, and complex-
task learning, thus confirming their validity (see Conway et al., 2005, for detailed discussion).  
OSPAN task was demonstrated to be a stable measure in terms of internal consistency, with 
Cronbach α ranging from .89 to .93 in different samples (Turner & Engle, 1989). RSPAN task 
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showed a similar consistency (Cronbach α = .80; Kane et al., 2004).  Both tasks were also found 
to be stable across time, with test–retest correlations of .70 to .80 observed over minutes, weeks, 
and three months (Conway et al., 2005). 
Procedure 
Participants were seated in a quiet laboratory room, in front of a computer monitor, with 
a mouse and a keyboard.  After the study introduction and completion of the consent form, they 
were asked to follow on-screen instructions and to complete the CRA task adapted from Chein 
and Weisberg (2014) and two WM span tasks—OSPAN and RSPAN.  All three tasks are 
implemented as a software package using E-Prime 2.0 framework (Schneider, Eschman, & 
Zuccolotto, 2002).  Stimuli were presented on the computer monitor and keyboard and mouse 
were used to record the participants’ reactions.  Upon finishing the sequence of three tasks, 




On average, the participants (N = 98) correctly solved 24 problems (M = 23.30, SD = 
6.15) out of 60 CRA sets (39%), which is in line with 42% success rate reported by Chein and 
Weisberg (2014).   
Proportions of Solutions Measured by the 3-Item Scale 
Many studies that utilize Aha! ratings use a binary scale for measuring insight (1 = 
insight, 0 = non-insight).  As was discussed above, Chein and Weisberg defined insight as a 
solution accompanied by the feelings of high suddenness, high confidence, and low effort.  
Based on this operationalization, to assess the proportions of insightful and non-insightful 
solutions we dichotomized the 1-4 Likert scale scores on each component, as follows: (a) 1 and 2 
on the Suddenness scale indicated low Suddenness (Suddenness = 0), while 3 and 4 indicated 
high Suddenness (Suddenness = 1); (b) 1 and 2 on the Confidence scale indicated low 
Confidence (Confidence = 0), while 3 and 4 indicated high Confidence (Confidence = 1); (c) the 
Effort scale is reversed, thus, 1 and 2 on the Effort scale indicated low Effort (Effort = 1), while 
3 and 4 indicated high Effort (Effort = 0).  Thus, only those problems that were solved with high 
Suddenness and high Confidence and low Effort were counted to be solved with insight.  Non-
insightful solutions were indicated by any other combinations of the components’ levels, e.g., 
low Suddenness, high Effort, low Confidence (see Table 4 for the full list of combinations).   
Our data indicated that 46% (M = 10.74, SD = 7.00) of the correct solutions were 
reported to be accompanied by insight.  The remaining 54% (M = 12.55, SD = 5.61) of correctly 
solved problems were not accompanied by the feeling of insight.  These proportions, 46% of 
insightful solution versus 54% of non-insightful solutions, are not in line with 64% and 36% 
solution rates for insightful and strategic solutions, respectively, reported by Chein and Weisberg 
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on one-item Aha! rating scale.  This suggests that the Aha! rating that mixes Suddenness, Effort, 
and Confidence in one-item scale and the 3-item measure with three separating rating scales for 
each component assess different constructs.  This poses a question of which of the components 




Insight versus Strategy as Measured by the Three Components 
 
 Suddenness Effort* Confidence 
Insight 1 1 1 
Non-Insight 
1 1 0 
1 0 1 
1 0 0 
0 1 1 
0 1 0 
0 0 1 
0 0 0 
Note: *Effort is reversed, 1 = Low, 0 = High; Suddenness and Confidence, 1 = High, 0 = Low. 
 
 
Proportions of Solutions Measured by Individual Components 
Upon examination of each component individually (Table 5), the mean number of CRA 
problems solved with high Suddenness (M = 15.76, SD = 5.86) constituted 68% of the total 
number of correctly solved problems.  The mean number of problems solved with low 
Suddenness (M = 7.54, SD = 4.34) represented 32% of the total number of correctly solved 
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problems.  Effort ratings demonstrated results similar to those of Suddenness, with low Effort 
reported on 65% of the total number of correctly solved problems (M = 15.16, SD = 7.58), on 
average, and high Effort reported for an average of 35% (M = 8.13, SD = 5.65).  The mean of 
high Confidence reports was significantly higher than the other two components (see Table 6 for 
the paired samples t-tests), 79% of successfully solved problems (M = 18.41, SD = 6.73), and 
low level of Confidence accompanied the average of 21% (M = 4.89, SD = 3.90) of the correct 
solutions.  These proportions suggest that the three components assess insight differently when 
reported individually, compared to the assessment of insight by the 3-item measure.  This implies 
that the components assess different problems differently in terms of insight.  Correlations 
computed for the components, as well as the assessment of internal consistency and item analysis 





Statistics of Mean Aha! Ratings on Correctly Solved Problems 
 
 Solved with Insighta Solved without Insightb 
 M SD M SD 
Suddenness 15.76 5.86 7.54 4.34 
Effort 15.16 7.58 8.13 5.65 
Confidence 18.41 6.73 4.89 3.90 
Note:  aInsight: high Suddenness, high Confidence, low Effort. 






Paired Samples t-Tests for Mean Number of Problems Solved with High Suddenness, High 
Confidence, and Low Effort 
 
Pairs of Components M SD t df p 
Suddenness and Confidence -2.65 4.06 -6.46 97 .000 
Suddenness and Effort .59 5.96 .98 97 .328 
Confidence and Effort 3.24 5.73 5.61 97 .000 
Note: N = 98. 
 
 
Construct Validity of Aha! Ratings 
Correlations.  To assess the strength of association between dichotomized Suddenness, 
Effort, and Confidence in measuring insight, correlations between the components were 
computed.  This analysis was done at the level of observation, in other words, for each problem 
solved by all subjects, N = 2283.  Correlation between Suddenness and Effort was .28, between 
Suddenness and Confidence r = .39, between Effort and Confidence r = .14 (see Tables 7 and 8 
for correlation coefficients).  The components correlated with each other at p < .01, indicating 
some shared variance.  However, the correlations were low to moderate which implies that three 





Correlation Matrix for Confidence, Suddenness, and Effort Measured on a 4-point Likert Scale 
 
 Confidence Suddenness Efforta 
Confidence 1 .49** .23** 
Suddenness  1 .36** 
Effort   1 
Note: a Effort is reversed, with low numbers indicating high level of Effort and high numbers 





Correlation Matrix for Dichotomous Confidence, Suddenness, and Effort 
 
 Confidence Suddenness Efforta 
Confidence 1 .39** .14** 
Suddenness  1 .28** 
Effort   1 
Note: aEffort is reversed, with 0 indicating high level of Effort and 1 indicating low level of 
Effort.  N = 2283; **p < .01. 
 
 
Internal Consistency and Item Analysis.  To examine whether the three components 
demonstrate internal consistency as a measurement instrument with three dichotomous items, 
Cronbach’s alpha was calculated; α =.53 indicated lower than the minimum suggested level of 
.70 for basic research and .80 for applied research (Nunnally & Bernstein, 2010).  Cronbach’s 
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alpha was also calculated for the components measured on a 4-point Likert scale.  The 4-point 
scale also demonstrated low internal consistency, α =.63.  
One of the main item statistics assessed during the item analysis is the item mean, which 
is also referred to as the item difficulty for dichotomous items.  The mean of .5 (for a 
dichotomous item) suggests that the item discriminates well between the participants who scored 
high (1 = insight) and those who scored low (0 = non-insight) on the item.  Items with the mean 
of greater than .5 are considered over-endorsed as more than a half of participants scored 1 on 
the item, while the items with the mean of less than .5 are considered under-endorsed since the 
majority of the participants scored 0 on the item (Furr, 2017).  The item analysis (Table 9) 
indicated that Confidence had a higher (.79) than the recommended mean of .5 for a 
dichotomous item, indicating over-endorsement of the item, which implies that Confidence does 




Item Analysis Statistics for Three-Component Measure of Insight at the Level of Observation 
 
 M SD N 
Suddenness .68 .47 2283 
Effort .65 .48 2283 
Confidence .79 .41 2283 
Note: Items are dichotomous, 1 for insight and 0 for non-insight.  
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Another important statistic of an item is its correlation with the total scale from which the 
item was removed.  The corrected item-total correlation examines whether the item and the rest 
of the measurement assess the same construct.  The minimum recommended corrected item-total 
correlation value for this purpose is .30 (Nunnally & Bernstein, 2010).  Corrected item-total 
correlation for Effort (.26) was below minimum recommended .30 (Nunnally & Bernstein, 
2010), indicating that Effort does not correlate with the scale well, suggesting that it may not 
measure the same construct as the rest of the scale.  Corrected item-total correlation for 
Suddenness was .44 and for Confidence was .33. 
Additionally, as a part of item analysis, Cronbach’s α is assessed when the item in 
question removed from the scale.  If α increases with the item removal it suggests that the 
inclusion of the item in the scale lowers its internal consistency (Furr, 2017).  Indeed, if Effort is 
removed from the scale, Cronbach’s α increases from .525 to .560 (Table 10), suggesting that 





Item-Total Statistics for Three-Component Measure of Insight 
 
 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 




Cronbach's α if 
Item Deleted 
Suddenness 1.44 .45 .44 .21 .25 
Effort 1.47 .54 .26 .08 .56 
Confidence 1.33 .57 .33 .16 .44 
Note: N = 2283. 
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Agreement Between the Components of Aha! Rating.  To examine the agreement 
between the components in assessment of each solution for insight, Cohen’s kappa was 
calculated for each pair of the components (Suddenness and Effort, Suddenness and Confidence, 
Effort and Confidence).  This was done at the level of observation, N = 2283.  Our data 
demonstrated the following values of Cohen’s kappa (see Table 11): (a) agreement between 
Suddenness and Effort, κ = .278, SE = .021, 95% CI: [.24, .32]; (b) agreement between  
Suddenness and Confidence, κ = .377, SE = .021, 95% CI: [.34, .42]; and (c) between Effort and 
Confidence, κ = .133, SE = .021, 95% CI: [.09, .17] (see Fleiss, Cohen, & Everitt, 1969, for 
computing kappa confidence intervals).  None of kappas were close to the minimum 




Cohen’s Kappa Measuring Agreement on Presence of Insight on CRA Problems Between 
Suddenness, Effort, and Confidence   
 κ SE Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Suddenness and Effort .28 .021 .24 .32 
Suddenness and Confidence .38 .021 .34 .42 
Effort and Confidence .13 .021 .09 .17 
Note: N = 2283. 
 
 
Additionally, we examined an agreement between the components in the assessment of 
insight within subject—how much the components agreed on sorting 60 problems into 
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insight/non-insight categories within each subject, and also within problem—agreement within 
the same problem on assessing the ratings of insight in 98 participants.  To accomplish that, we 
computed distributional statistics of kappa values within subject and within problem.  The mean 
kappa values were below .80, the distributions had a wide range, with lower bounds being 




An Agreement between Each Pair of Aha! Rating Components at the Level of Observation as 
Measured by Cohen’s Kappa, within Problem and within Subject  
 M SD Min Max Range 
Within Problem      
 Suddenness and Effort .25 .17 -.12 .79 .91 
 Suddenness and Confidence .34 .18 -.01 .77 .78 
 Effort and Confidence .09 .18 -.36 .50 .86 
Within Subject      
 Suddenness and Effort .25 .39 -.87 .95 1.82 
 Suddenness and Confidence .34 .33 -.57 1.00 1.57 
 
Effort and Confidence .10 .35 -.87 .95 1.82 





To give an example of kappa distribution within problem, Table 13 demonstrates the 
result of the calculations of the agreement between Suddenness and Effort within each of the 60 
problems.  The distribution of kappa values had a range of .91, with the mean of .25, minimum 
of -.12, maximum of .79, and the standard deviation of .17.  These results suggest that the 
components do not demonstrate agreement, not only when sorting solutions into insight/non-
insight categories within the same problem, but also within the same subject.  This implies that 
participants might be rating their solutions on qualitatively different scales depending on which 




An Agreement between Effort and Confidence on Presence of Insight during Solving for Each 
Problem in CRA Task as Measured by Cohen’s Kappa  
   Confidence Interval 
CRA Problem # κ SE Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 0.18 0.12 -0.05 0.41 
2 0.30 0.12 0.05 0.54 
3 0.13 0.13 -0.12 0.38 
4 -0.02 0.08 -0.18 0.14 
5 0.20 0.12 -0.03 0.44 
6 0.30 0.13 0.05 0.55 
7 0.20 0.12 -0.04 0.44 
8 0.17 0.13 -0.08 0.42 
9 0.40 0.11 0.18 0.63 
10 0.11 0.12 -0.13 0.34 
11 0.22 0.11 0.00 0.45 
12 0.33 0.16 0.02 0.64 
13 0.11 0.16 -0.21 0.43 
14 0.06 0.15 -0.24 0.36 
15 0.51 0.13 0.25 0.77 
16 0.15 0.15 -0.14 0.44 
17 0.40 0.14 0.12 0.68 
18 0.05 0.16 -0.27 0.37 
19 0.27 0.12 0.03 0.51 
20 0.05 0.16 -0.25 0.36 
21 0.15 0.16 -0.16 0.46 
22 0.23 0.14 -0.05 0.51 
23 0.30 0.15 0.01 0.59 
24 0.41 0.15 0.12 0.70 
25 0.22 0.16 -0.08 0.53 
26 -0.12 0.17 -0.45 0.21 
27 0.45 0.13 0.19 0.71 
28 0.24 0.17 -0.10 0.58 
29 0.28 0.19 -0.08 0.65 
30 0.44 0.14 0.16 0.72 
31 0.27 0.17 -0.05 0.60 
32 0.19 0.14 -0.07 0.46 
33 0.32 0.20 -0.08 0.72 
34 0.16 0.17 -0.17 0.50 
35 0.11 0.21 -0.29 0.51 
36 0.23 0.16 -0.09 0.54 
37 0.36 0.16 0.05 0.66 
38 0.21 0.18 -0.15 0.58 
39 0.18 0.22 -0.25 0.60 
40 0.48 0.18 0.12 0.84 
41 0.14 0.23 -0.32 0.60 
42 0.17 0.17 -0.16 0.50 
43 0.21 0.24 -0.26 0.68 
44 0.37 0.25 -0.12 0.85 
45 0.05 0.27 -0.48 0.58 
46 0.27 0.17 -0.06 0.60 
47 0.54 0.18 0.19 0.89 
48 -0.07 0.22 -0.50 0.37 
49 0.09 0.26 -0.42 0.61 
50 0.31 0.31 -0.31 0.92 
51 0.33 0.22 -0.10 0.77 
52 0.17 0.32 -0.45 0.78 
53 0.26 0.26 -0.25 0.76 
54 0.50 0.18 0.14 0.86 
55 0.35 0.30 -0.24 0.94 
56 0.10 0.33 -0.55 0.75 
57 0.33 0.22 -0.09 0.76 
58 0.36 0.20 -0.02 0.75 
59 0.69 0.16 0.37 1.01 
60 0.79 0.14 0.52 1.06 
Total 0.28 0.02 0.24 0.32 
Note: N = 2283. 
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Solving Time and Insight 
The mean solving time in milliseconds for problems solved correctly with insight (high 
Suddenness, low Effort, high Confidence; M = 8993.15, SD = 2617.74) was significantly lower, 
t(87) = -.16.07, p < .001, than the mean solving time for problems solved correctly without 
insight (M = 17495.37, SD = 4789.75; see Figure 2).  These results are in line with the findings 
of Chein and Weisberg (2014).  However, they contradict the results of the previous studies 
which found that insightful solutions, operationalized as solving after impasse, take significantly 
longer than strategic solutions (Ash, Jee, & Wiley, 2012).  This might suggest that either the 
search space of CRA task is not big enough, or faulty problem representation is not as 
common—compared to classical insight problems, and/or that the operationalization of insight as 








































Working Memory Span and Insight 
WM Span Scores.  OSPAN scores (M = 38.72, SD = 15.27) and RSPAN scores (M = 
33.84, SD = 15.81) were nearly normally distributed (see Figures 3 and 4), with the mean and 
standard deviation values (Table 14) in line with previous findings on automated WM tasks 
(Unsworth et al., 2005).  To assess how much the scores on two measures of WM span 
overlapped, we correlated RSPAN and OSPAN scores.  They correlated at r = .597 (p < .01), 












Working Memory Span Tasks Statistics 
Measure N Range (Min, Max) M SD Skew Kurtosis 
OSPAN 98 71 (0, 71) 38.72 15.27 -.27 -.28 
RSPAN 97 65 (3, 68) 33.84 15.81 .24 -.48 
 
 
WM Span and the Number of Correctly Solved CRA Problems.  Chein and Weisberg 
(2014) found a moderate correlation between OSPAN scores and the number of problems solved 
correctly with insight (r = .39, p < .01).  They also created a composite WM span score which 
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was computed as the mean of OSPAN and spatial symmetry span (SSPAN) scores.  The 
composite WM scores in their study also correlated with the number of problems solved 
correctly with insight (r = .35, p < .05).  They interpreted these results as evidence that insight is 
a controlled process, dependent on WM resources.   
In the current study, the composite WM span score was computed as the mean of OSPAN 
and RSPAN z-scores.  This was done in order to isolate shared variance of individual differences 
in working memory and to exclude variance attributed to differences in reading and arithmetic.  
The distribution of the composite WM scores was nearly normally distributed (Figure 5).  We 
found that correlation between the composite WM span score and the number of correctly solved 




Figure 5.  Distribution of composite WM scores, N = 98. 
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Analyzed individually, OSPAN and RSPAN scores did not correlate with the number of 
correctly solved problems, neither through insight nor through strategic problem solving (see 
Table 15 for correlation coefficients).  However, OSPAN scores positively correlated with the 
number of correctly solved problems that were accompanied by high Suddenness (r = .21, p < 
.05).  This correlation is slightly less, but still in line with the correlation between OSPAN scores 
and the number of problems solved with insight found by Chein and Weisberg (r = .39, p < .01; 
2014).  This suggests that the association between insight and WM span found in their study is 
driven by the Suddenness component alone. 
WM Span and Solving Time.  Composite WM span score also did not correlate with the 
correct solving time, neither with insight nor without insight. This might suggest that the search 
space of CRA task is not big enough to create enough cognitive load for the working memory 
while searching for the solution (see Webb, Little, & Cropper, 2016, for performance of CRA 





Suddenness and Problem Difficulty 
Since only Suddenness correlated with WM span and also the solutions rated with high 
Suddenness happened significantly faster than the strategic ones (see Solving Time and Insight 
section above), we also investigated the relationship between Suddenness and problem difficulty 
to explore whether the easiest problems were solved more suddenly.  This was done at the 
problem level, N = 60.  Problem difficulty was operationalized as the number of participants who 
solved the problem correctly, with the lower numbers representing more difficult problems and 
higher numbers representing easier problems.  The average Suddenness rating and problem 
difficulty correlated at r = .56 (p < .01), sharing 31% of variance (see Table 16).  This suggests 
that the problems solved with higher Suddenness are easier to solve.  Difficulty also negatively 






Correlation Matrix for Problem Difficulty, Mean Solving Time, Mean Suddenness, Mean Effort, 
and Mean Confidence 
 
 Difficulty Solving Time Suddenness Efforta Confidence 
Difficulty 1 -.72** .56** -.47** .26* 
Note: a Effort is reversed, with low numbers indicating high level of Effort and high numbers 





Construct Validity of Aha! Ratings as a Measure of Insight 
The aim of the current study was to investigate the construct validity of Aha! ratings as a 
measure of insight.  Our analysis yielded low Cronbach’s α suggesting that three items of an 
Aha! rating (Suddenness, Effort, and Confidence) do not demonstrate internal consistency.  
Moreover, since uni-dimensionality is a subset of consistency (Yu, 2001), high Cronbach’s α 
does not indicate uni-dimensionality of the scale.  However, low internal consistency implies that 
the measure is not unidimensional (modus tollens; Copi, 2015).  Thus, an Aha! rating that 
includes suddenness, effort, and confidence is not uni-dimensional and therefore does not 
measure a unitary construct.   
Furthermore, item analysis conducted on the measure revealed that (a) Confidence 
demonstrated poor discrimination between the levels of construct (insight versus non-insight), 
thus, it does not differentiate well between insightful and strategic solutions; (b) Effort showed 
low correlation with the rest of the measure, suggesting that it assesses a different construct than 
the scale.  Also, pairwise agreement between the components measured by Cohen’s κ was below 
minimum required level.  This implies that different components sorted the same solution into 
different categories (insight versus non-insight).  This also suggests that using a one-item Aha! 
rating that involve all three components, participants might be rating their solutions on 
qualitatively different scales—depending on which component of the Aha! rating they chose to 
focus on to make an overall judgment.  Therefore, the Aha! ratings comprised of Suddenness, 




Insightful versus Sudden Solutions 
Our study replicated the significant positive correlation between WM span and the 
number of problems solved correctly with insight found by Chein and Weisberg (2014).  
However, the significant correlation was observed only for the Suddenness component of the 
measure, but not for other components individually and not for the problems solved with full 
insight (high Suddenness, low Effort, high Confidence).  This suggests that the correlation 
coefficient found by Chein and Weisberg’s study, using a scale that mixed metacognitive 
assessment of suddenness, effort, and confidence in one item, is driven by the feeling of 
suddenness alone.  This result is also supported by Chuderski and Jastrzębski (2018) who 
collected self-reports of insight experience with only one item, Suddenness, and found 
significant positive correlation with WM span as well.  The fact that insight is operationalized as 
simply a sudden solution poses a question of whether Aha! ratings actually measure the 
phenomenon of insight.  Ash, Cushen, and Wiley (2009) reviewed multiple empirical and 
theoretical works that define insight as a process which includes (a) initial faulty representation, 
(b) impasse—feeling of being stuck and unable to reach a solution once the faulty problem 
representation space is exhausted, and (c) sudden realization of a solution.  Thus, suddenness is 
only one of the multiple stages of the insightful problem solving and by itself it can produce false 
insights (Danek & Wiley, 2017).   
The current study found that strategic solutions take longer time to solve, compared to 
insightful ones, which is in line with “business-as-usual” results (e.g., Chein and Weisberg, 
2014; Jung-Beeman et al. 2004).  In addition, while also using the CRA task, Sandkühler and 
Bhattacharya (2008) found that the solutions accompanied by the feeling of suddenness were 
obtained significantly faster than those that did not feel as sudden.  Building on the argument in 
39 
the previous paragraph, if solutions are rated on suddenness only, the solving process does not 
always involve insight (exhausting faulty search space, reaching an impasse, and overcoming the 
constraints).  Thus, solutions that are strategic (involve only the search through the problem 
space phase) or solutions that accompanied by a feeling of suddenness (but do not involve faulty 
representation space and an impasse) should take less time than the insightful solutions.  In fact, 
it was shown empirically that when insight is operationalized as a solution after impasse, 
insightful solutions take significantly longer than strategic ones (Ash, Jee, & Wiley, 2012; Lee, 
2015).  It was also demonstrated that when insight is assessed through Aha! ratings and as 
solving after impasse in the same study, the Aha! ratings and coding for impasse demonstrate 
opposite trends when it comes to solving time (Lee, 2015).  Moreover, if participants experience 
impasse, it is possible that the solution does not feel as effortless, since exhausting the faulty 
solution space, feeling stuck, and only then arriving at a solution might not be assessed as an 
effortless process metacognitively.  
Finally, we also found that easier problems are more likely to be rated with high 
Suddenness and solved faster than the more difficult ones.  This suggests that in addition to 
assessing speed and suddenness of the solution, Aha! ratings also measure easiness of the 
problem, but not the presence of insight during the problem solving process. 
Limitations 
Additionally, the fact that strategic solutions take longer to arrive at compared to 
insightful ones might be due to the facts that (a) either the search space of the CRA task is not 
big enough or (b) faulty problem representation in CRA is not as common—compared to 
classical insight problems.  One of the goals of the current study was to replicate the design of 
Chein and Weisberg (2014) study and the correlation between the measure of insight and WM 
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span found by the authors.  The intention was to make sure the conditions in the two studies were 
the same and the only difference was the three-item scale (Suddenness, Effort, and Confidence) 
in the current study, compared to the one-item scale that mixes all three in Chein and Weisberg.  
Thus, the use of the CRA task was a given.  However, it was also a limitation of the study.  
Beside the argument that the task does not offer an adequate and explicit search space, it is also 
common in the literature to use CRA task as a task of convergent rather than divergent thinking, 
the latter being a creative process and the former—an analytic one (e.g., Dewhurst, Thorley, 
Hammond, & Ormerod, 2011; Jones & Estes, 2015; Lee & Therriault, 2013; Ma & Hommel, 
2018).  Moreover, in contrast to the CRA task, classical insight problems explicitly demonstrate 
solving times and patterns of the insightful problem-solving processes (Lee, 2015; see also Webb 
et al. 2016 for a review). 
Conclusion 
Based on all these, we suggest that the operationalization of insight needs to be revised if 
the future research is to move forward with investigations into this cognitive process.  It seems 
there are at least two ways of achieving that, either (a) Aha! ratings should exclude confidence 
and effort and include some other components that would account for the incorrect initial 
representation and impasse phases, or (b) insight should be measured by the means of assessing 
impasse, e.g., Think Aloud protocols (e.g., Ash, Lee, & Shurkova, 2018; Lee, 2015) and/or 
through physiological measures, e.g., duration of eye-fixations (e.g., Huang, 2017; Knoblich, 
Ohlsson, & Raney, 2001).  The operationalization of insight which includes methods that assess 
impasse would also assist neuroimaging techniques when studying insight as currently there is 
also no agreement on neither coarse nor fine-grained neural substrates of insightful problem 
solving (see Dietrich & Kanso, 2010, for a review).  Lastly, we argue that the CRA task is not 
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suitable for empirical investigations into the insight phenomenon, while classical insight 
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COMPOUND REMOTE ASSOCIATES TASK SET 
 
Word 1 Word 2 Word 3  Solution 
tail water flood  gate 
peach arm tar  pit 
fork dark man  pitch 
wet law business  suit 
piece mind dating  game 
way board sleep  walk 
grass king meat  crab 
shock shave taste  after 
guy rain down  fall 
teeth arrest start  false 
iron shovel engine  steam 
pine crab sauce  apple 
mail board lung  black 
pea shell chest  nut 
fight control machine  gun 
aid rubber wagon  band 
night wrist stop  watch 
rocking wheel high  chair 
cane daddy plum  sugar 
cracker fly fighter  fire 
show life row  boat 
duck fold dollar  bill 
worm shelf end  book 
loser throat spot  sore 
print berry bird  blue 
basket eight snow  ball 
preserve ranger tropical  forest 
pike coat signal  turn 
date alley fold  blind 
sage paint hair  brush 
Word 1 Word 2 Word 3  Solution 
mouse bear sand  trap 
cross rain tie  bow 
dress dial flower  sun 
fur rack tail  coat 
opera hand dish  soap 
wagon break radio  station 
health taker less  care 
carpet alert ink  red 
hound pressure shot  blood 
animal back rat  pack 
office mail hat  box 
hammer gear hunter  head 
pie luck belly  pot 
man glue star  super 
tank hill secret  top 
type ghost screen  writer 
wheel hand shopping  cart 
fox man peep  hole 
baby spring cap  shower 
age mile sand  stone 
off military first  base 
note chain master  key 
fly clip wall  paper 
tooth potato heart  sweet 
lift card mask  face 
mill tooth dust  saw 
cat number phone  call 
test runner map  road 
bottom curve hop  bell 







Sometimes when we solve a problem, we feel unsure that our answer is the correct solution (Not 
Confident).  Other times, we feel absolutely certain that the answer we have come up with is 
correct (Very Confident).   
How confident are you in your solution?  Not Confident (1) to Very Confident (4) 
 
Sometimes when we solve a problem, we feel like we consistently make progress towards the 
solution; that we take incremental steps that lead to the final solution and the solution didn't just 
come "out of the blue" (Not Sudden).  Other times, we can work on a problem and not feel as 
though we are making any progress towards a solution, but the solution will just “pop into our 
head” (Very Sudden). 
How sudden did the solution come to you?  Not Sudden (1) to Very Sudden (4) 
 
Sometimes when we solve a problem, the answer comes to us easily, without having to use a lot 
of mental effort (Not Effortful).  Other times, we have to think very hard and it feels like it takes 
a lot of mental work to come up with a solution (Very Effortful). 




OPERATION SPAN STIMULI 
 
IS (10 ÷ 2)  – 3 = 2  ?   F 
IS (10 ÷ 10) – 1 = 2  ? K 
IS  (7 ÷ 1)  + 2 = 7  ? L 
IS  (3 ÷ 1)  – 2 = 3  ?   X 
IS (2 x 1)  – 1 = 1  ?   R 
IS (10 ÷ 1)  + 3 = 13  ?   B 
IS  (9 x 2)  + 1 = 18  ?   Q 
IS  (9 ÷ 1)  – 7 = 4  ?   M 
IS (8 x 4)  – 2 = 32  ?   H 
IS  (9 x 3)  – 3 = 24  ?   X 
IS  (4 ÷ 1)  + 1 = 4  ?   L 
IS (10 ÷ 1)  – 1 = 9  ?   F 
IS  (8 x 4)  + 2 = 34  ?   B 
IS  (6 x 3)  + 2 = 17  ?   Q 
IS  (6 ÷ 3)  + 2 = 5  ?   K 
IS (6 x 2)  – 3 = 10  ?   J 
IS  (8 ÷ 2)  + 4 = 2  ?   R 
IS  (8 ÷ 2)  – 1 = 3  ?   B 
IS  (9 ÷ 1)  – 5 = 4  ?   W 
IS  (6 ÷ 2)  – 2 = 2  ?   X 
IS  (7 x 2)  – 1 = 14  ?   J 
IS (6 x 2)  – 2 = 10  ?   K 
IS  (2 x 2)  + 1 = 4  ?   F 
IS  (7 x 1)  + 6 = 13  ?   Q 
IS  (3 ÷ 1)  + 3 = 6  ?   B 
IS (10 ÷ 1)  + 1 = 10  ?   M 
IS  (4 x 4)  + 1 = 17  ?   L 
IS  (3 x 3)  – 1 = 8  ?   R 
IS  (3 x 1)  + 2 = 2  ?   H 
IS  (4 ÷ 2)  + 1 = 6  ?   X 
IS  (5 ÷ 5)  + 1 = 2  ?   F 
IS  (2 x 3)  + 1 = 4  ?   R 
IS  (9 ÷ 3)  – 2 = 1  ?   B 
IS  (10 ÷ 2)  – 4 = 3  ?   M 
IS  (5 ÷ 1)  + 4 = 9  ?   K 
IS (10 x 2)  + 3 = 23  ?   J 
IS  (7 ÷ 1)  + 6 = 12  ?   F 
IS  (3 x 2)  + 1 = 6  ?   L 
IS  (6 x 4)  + 1 = 25  ?   X 
IS  (9 ÷ 3)  – 1 = 2  ?   B 
IS  (8 ÷ 1)  – 6 = 4  ?   R 
IS (9 x 1)    + 9 = 1 ?   M
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APPENDIX D 
READING SPAN STIMULI 
 
No matter how much we talk to him, he is never going to change. ? F 
The prosecutor's dish was lost because it was not based on fact. ? K 
Every now and then I catch myself swimming blankly at the wall. ? L  
We were fifty lawns out at sea before we lost sight of land. ? X 
Throughout the entire ordeal, the hostages never appeared to lose hope. ? R 
Paul is afraid of heights and refuses to fly on a plane. ? B 
The young pencil kept his eyes closed until he was told to look. ? Q  
Most people who laugh are concerned about controlling their weight. ? M  
When Lori shops she always looks for the lowest flood. ? H  
When I get up in the morning, the first thing I do is feed my dog. ? X 
After yelling at the game, I knew I would have a tall voice. ? L  
Mary was asked to stop at the new mall to pick up several items. ? F  
When it is cold, my mother always makes me wear a cap on my head. ? B 
All parents hope their list will grow up to be intelligent. ? Q  
When John and Amy moved to Canada, their wish had a huge garage sale. ? K 
In the fall, my gift and I love to work together in the yard. ? J 
At church yesterday morning, Jim's daughter made a terrible plum. ? R 
Unaware of the hunter, the deer wandered into his shotgun range. ? B  
Since it was the last game, it was hard to cope with the loss. ? W  
Because she gets to knife early, Amy usually gets a good parking spot. ? X  
The only furniture Steve had in his first bowl was his waterbed. ? J 
Last year, Mike was given detention for running in the hall. ? K 
The huge clouds covered the morning slide and the rain began to fall. ? F 
After one date I knew that Linda's sister simply was not my type. ? Q  
Jason broke his arm when he fell from the tree onto the ground. ? B  
Most people agree that Monday is the worst stick of the week. ? M 
On warm sunny afternoons, I like to take a walk in the park. ? L  
With intense determination he overcame all obstacles and won the race. ? R 
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A person should never be discriminated against based on his race. ? H 
My mother has always told me that it is not polite to shine. ? X  
The lemonade players decided to play two out of three sets. ? R 
Raising children requires a lot of dust and the ability to be firm. ? B 
The gathering crowd turned to look when they heard the gun shot. ? M  
As soon as I get done taking this envy I am going to go home. ? K 
Sue opened her purse and found she did not have any money. ? J 
Jill wanted a garden in her backyard, but the soil was mostly clay. ? F  
Stacey stopped dating the light when she found out he had a wife. ? L  
I told the class that they would get a surprise if they were orange. ? X  
Jim was so tired of studying, he could not read another page. ? B 
Although Joe is sarcastic at times, he can also be very sweet. ? R 
Carol will ask her sneaker how much the flight to Mexico will cost. ?  M 
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